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NOTES

Missed Opportunity: Congress's
Attempted
Response
to
the
World's Demand for the Violence
Against Women Act
ABSTRACT

The Supreme Court's decision in U.S. v. Morrison struck
down, as a violation of the Commerce Clause, § 13,981 of the
Violence Against Women Act, that provided a private right of
action for victims of gender-motivated violence to assert against
their abusers. However, § 13,981 should have been affirmed as
implementing legislation designed to fulfill U.S. obligations
under the InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights
and customary international law. Recognizing § 13,981 as
implementing legislation serves as a foundation for the United
States to restore itself as a legitimate human rights leader
capable of both appreciating its own international obligations
and pressuring other nations to come into compliance with
international human rights obligations. Furthermore, only
through setting a precedent recognizing broad Congressional
authority to pass implementing legislation would there be a
structure in place for Congress to devote itself to domesticating
the legal obligationspresent in non-self-executing human rights
treaties.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Vice President Joseph R. Biden once described the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA) as a necessary prerequisite to breaking
"down the barriers that continue to exist in the unequal application of
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the law."' Certainly, few can disagree that the VAWA serves a noble,
if not moral, purpose in providing legal protection for victims of
domestic and gender-motivated 2 violence. Indeed, the international
community, as well as many members of Congress, heralded the
progressive legislation as a standard-bearer, ensuring human rights
regardless of sex and gender. 3
However, the bill's advocates felt a stunning disappointment on
May 15, 2000, when the United States Supreme Court announced its
landmark decision striking down the VAWA's prize possession, the
private right of action. 4 This private right of action, found in
§ 13,981, allowed victims of gender-motivated violence to bypass the
difficulty of achieving a criminal conviction and to seek civil damages
directly from their abusers.5 The Morrison Court refused to uphold
§ 13,981 on either Commerce Clause or Equal Protection grounds. 6
However, a justification exists for upholding § 13,981 that was not
raised by the Solicitor General before the Court.
This Note advocates the proposition that the Supreme Court
should have upheld the private right of action contained in § 13,981
as proper implementing legislation for U.S. obligations under both
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and
customary international law (CIL).
Both the ICCPR and CIL
recognize gender-motivated violence as a human rights violation and
encourage nations to implement strategies capable of redressing such
violence. 7 The private right of action serves as a concrete domestic
codification of U.S. international obligations. 8
Congress possesses wide discretion when entering into treaties
and imposing the statutory guidelines necessary to enforce the

1.
Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States:Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103rd Cong.
194 (1993) (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
Congress Enacted VAWA on Sept. 13, 1994. Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. §
13981 (1994).
2.
VAWA defines the term "crime of violence motivated by gender" as "a crime
of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in
part, to an animus based on the victim's gender." 42 U.S.C. § 13981. Black's Law
Dictionary defines "domestic violence" as "[v]iolence between members of a household,
usu. spouses; an assault or other violent act committed by one member of a household
against another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1564 (7th ed. 1999).
3.
Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights Purposes of the Violence Against Women

Act and InternationalLaw's Enhancement of CongressionalPower, 22 HOUs. J. INT'L L.
209, 213-15 (2000).
4.
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (declaring the
private right of action in VAWA unconstitutional).
42 U.S.C. § 13981.
5.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
6.
7.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 21, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR];
Paust, supra note 3, at 209.
8.
Paust, supra note 3, at 209.
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mandates of those treaties. 9 Moreover, the Supreme Court has
recognized previously that the United States is subject to jus cogens
norms, citing the Constitution's language regarding the binding
nature of the law of nations.10 Congress thus deserved significant
deference from the federal judiciary when enacting legislation
creating the private right of action because of its intersection with
international legal obligations.
The credibility of the United States' commitment to human
rights has suffered since the dawning of the war on terror. The
Court's recognition of the VAWA as a centerpiece of the U.S. strategy
for adhering to international gender violence norms would have
symbolized a recommitment to human rights, particularly human
rights treaties. "[A] fuller, more complete conception of law demands
that American law be pictured alongside international law," and only
through moves such as recognizing the international legitimacy of the
VAWA can that be accomplished."
This Note offers an understanding of the intersection between
§ 13,981, international legal obligations, and the effect of a strong
treaty power doctrine on U.S. human rights credibility and the
international human rights regime. Part II outlines the history of the
Morrison decision and Congressional treaty implementing powers.
Part III examines the negative effects the Supreme Court's ruling in
Morrison inflicted on U.S. human rights credibility. Furthering this
discussion, Part IV analyzes how § 13,981 implements the ICCPR and
satisfies customary law obligations requiring legislative action.
Finally, Part IV discusses the chilling effect of the Supreme Court's
decision on international relations, the future of implementing
legislation, and Congress's willingness to engage international
human rights treaties.

II. BACKGROUND: EXPLORING THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

A. The History of United States v. Antonio J. Morrison
The Supreme Court's decision in U.S. v. Morrison determined
that neither the Commerce Clause nor the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause could serve as a basis for Congressional
authority to enact the private right of action contained in § 13,981 of
the VAWA.1 2 The U.S. Solicitor General made the tactical decision to

9.

Id. at 216-20.

10.

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 483

(1887).
11.
Noah Feldman, When Judges Make Foreign Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
2008, (Magazine), at 50, 52.
12.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
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put before the Court only issues pertaining to the extent of Commerce
Clause authority and the limitation of the Fourteenth Amendment's
State Action Doctrine.' 3
The particular facts of the Morrison decision prove useful as an
illustration of how § 13,981 functions. In the fall of 1994, Christy
Brzonkala was sexually assaulted and raped by Antonio Morrison
and James Crawford. Brzonkala was in her first year at Virginia
Polytechnical Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) and
Morrison and Crawford were members of the Virginia Tech football
team. 14 During the Virginia Tech hearing, Morrison conceded that he
continued to have sex with Brzonkala despite being verbally told "no"
twice.' 5 Virginia Tech punished Morrison with a suspension.' 6 No
sanctions were issued against Crawford.' 7 The Virginia grand jury
failed to indict either Morrison or Crawford due to an alleged lack of
sufficient evidence. 18
Brzonkala then took advantage of the recently enacted civil
remedy provided by VAWA's § 13,981.19 Brzonkala's VAWA suit
served as the initial constitutional test for the private right of action's
civil remedy when the District Court for the Western District of
Virginia held that Congress did not have the necessary authority to
enact § 13,981.
The Morrison decision's greatest constitutional impact is the
extension of the Rehnquist Court's federalism revolution. The
federalism revolution finds its roots in the Court's infamous Guns
Free School Zone Act decision in United States v. Lopez.2 0

The

Morrison Court found that violence against women was non-economic
activity. 21 Moreover, the Morrison majority rejected the argument
"that Congress may regulate non-economic, violent criminal conduct
based solely on the conduct's aggregate effect on interstate
commerce." 22 The Morrison Court's primary concern was that if the
court upheld § 13,981's civil remedy, functionally, Congress could
regulate all violent crimes. 23 The Court came to this conclusion
despite significant evidence in the record that violence against women
substantially impacts commerce by affecting a woman's ability to

See id. at 603-10 (addressing only the question of Constitutional legitimacy
13.
through the lens of the Commerce Clause and Equal Protection Doctrine).
Id. at 603-04.
14.
Id.
15.
16.
Id.
17.
Id.
Id.
18.

19.

Id. at 604.

20.
21.
22.
23.

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617.
Id.
Id.
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work and engage in the marketplace. 24 This evidence laid the
foundation for Justice Souter's strong dissent. 25
The Morrison Court discounted evidence that showed a low
success rate for domestic violence prosecutions and that victims often
experienced prosecutorial discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.26 Brzonkala argued that state-level bias resulted
in "insufficient investigation and prosecution of gender-motivated
crime, inappropriate focus on the behavior and credibility of the
victims of that crime, and unacceptably lenient punishments for those
who are actually convicted of gender-motivated violence."2 7
The foundation for the Court's rejection of this equal protection
argument is the State Action Doctrine established in the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Cruikshank.28 The essential
premise of this doctrine is that both the Due Process Clause and the
Equal Protection Clause only constrain state actors and cannot be
used as a basis for rulings regarding the actions of private
individuals.2 9 The Morrison majority held that even if the petitioner
proved gender-based disparate treatment by the state in the instant
case, § 13,981 is still invalid because it is aimed at private individuals
who committed acts of gender-motivated violence.3 0
B. Congress's ConstitutionalMandate to Implement Treaties
The Supreme Court has long recognized Congress's
constitutionally grounded authority to enact domestic legislation to
bring the United States into compliance with treaty or CIL
obligations. 3 '
Additionally, Congress retains the authority to
implement treaty or CIL requirements even when doing so abridges
traditional areas of state interest.3 2 The United States maintains a
leadership role at the forefront of a new human rights regime.3 3 The
U.S. position in this field necessitates a reexamination of Congress's
ability to enact legislation and preserve international human rights
credibility. Indeed, noted constitutional scholar Noah Feldman
suggests that "[it] is becoming increasingly clear that the defining
constitutional problem for the present generation will be the nature
of the relationship of the United States to what is somewhat

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 614-16.
Id. at 628-29.
Id. at 627.
Id. at 620.
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 549-52 (1875).
Id.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626-27 (2000).
Paust, supra note 3, at 215.
Id.
Feldman, supra note 11, at 52.
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optimistically called the international order."34 Most importantly, "it
includes questions of momentous consequence, like whether
international law should be treated as law in the United States."3 5
Certainly, an inquiry into Professor Feldman's concerns must begin
with Congress's authority to enact legislation originating in
international law.
1.

Congressional Authority Arising from Constitutional Treaty
Powers

Treaty laws traditionally allocate a very limited role for the
judicial branch, wisely leaving the process up to both the President
and Congress. Indeed, the Constitution does not specifically assign
any role to the courts in the treaty process.3 6 The Constitution
provides that the President "shall have power, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of
the Senators present concur."3 7 Congress's authority originates from
Article I, § 8, Clause 10 of the Constitution (the Define and Punish
Clause), which grants Congress the express authority to define and
punish "offenses against the law of nations" through statutory
enactment.3 8
Moreover, Congress draws upon significant
discretionary authority from Article I, § 8, Clause 18 (the Necessary
and Proper Clause) "[tjo make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers," which
includes implementing international treaty and CIL obligations into
domestic legislation.3 9 Finally, Article 6 (the Supremacy Clause)
requires that "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby," thus
allowing Congressional legislation enacting treaty obligations to
supersede other constitutional concerns. 4 0 Congress has substantial
authority to serve as the conduit for introducing international law
into U.S domestic law. The difficulty arises in positioning Congress's
constitutional authority in an increasingly international stage.

34.
Id.
35.
Id.
See U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 3 (providing roles for the President and the
36.
Congress in the treaty-making process, and failing to mention the courts).
37.
Id.
38.
Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10; Brief for International Law Scholars and Human
Rights Experts as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 18, United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29) [hereinafter Brief for Int'l Law
Scholars].
39.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18; Brief for Int'l Law Scholars, supra note 38, at
18.
40.
U.S. CONST. art. 6.
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The Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. Holland laid the
foundation for the Court's treatment of treaty-based legislation. 41
The 1920 decision upheld the federal Migratory Bird Treaty Act of
1918, despite evidence that the legislation abridged traditionally held
states' rights under the Tenth Amendment. 4 2 Citing the Supremacy
Clause, Justice Holmes wrote for the majority that "the great body of
private relations usually fall within the control of the State, but a
treaty may override its power . ...43
Most importantly, the Missouri v. Holland Court removed the
Tenth Amendment barrier to treaty-implementing legislation,
recognizing Congress's need to fulfill obligations in the international
political arena. 44 Thus, so long as the Constitution does not explicitly
prohibit any particular requirement of a lawfully entered treaty,
.Congress has substantial discretion when enacting legislation that
brings treaties into force. 45 Speaking directly on the concept of
implementing legislation, Holmes wrote that "[i]f the treaty is valid
there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute under Article
I, § 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the
Government." 46
2.

Congressional Authority Arising out of Customary International
Law

CIL is a second source of international authority to justify
legislation that the Supreme Court might otherwise strike down as
unconstitutional. CIL "consists of the rules of law derived from the
consistent conduct of States acting out of the belief that the law
required them to act in that way." 47 Unlike treaty law, CIL is

41.
42.
43.

Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
Id. at 435.
Id. at 434.

44

With regard to that we may add that when we are dealing with words
that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United
States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the
development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the
most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope
that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost
their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a
nation. The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole
experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years
ago. The treaty in question does not contravene any prohibitory words
to be found in the Constitution.

Id. at 433.
Id.
45.
Id. at 432.
46.
47.
SHABTAI ROSENNE, PRATICE AND METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 55
(1984).
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The
codified through extensive international recognition.4 8
International Court of Justice holds that when deducing "the
existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the
conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with such rules,
and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule
should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as
indications of the recognition of a new rule." 49 When consensus
among nations is great, state practice become jus cogensso or
peremptory norms widely recognized as CIL.5 1 Protection of human
rights has been recognized as a fundamental norm of CIL. 52
The Supreme Court has not explicitly recognized the binding
effect of CIL on U.S. domestic law. However, strong evidence exists
that CIL, particularly when accompanied by treaty obligations,
provides sufficient authority for the enactment of legislation in
compliance with these obligations.5 3 As early as 1887, the Supreme
Court held in United States v. Arjona that the law of nations may
compel Congress to take necessary steps to conform U.S. domestic
law to international norms. 54 In Arjona, the Supreme Court found
that Congress had an interest, if not responsibility, to ensure the
engaged
in
and punishment
of individuals
investigation
counterfeiting money.5 5 Chief Justice Waite argued that every nation
had the right and expectation to rely on a foreign nation to protect its
currency from fraud in order to ensure the viability of industry and
business. 56
Furthermore, the Supreme Court did not require Congress to use
the law of nations as an explicit justification when enacting
legislation to achieve the above purpose; the existence of a recognized
The Supreme Court
international obligation alone sufficed. 57
reaffirmed this premise one hundred years later by limiting the
court's role to "discern[ing] some legislative purpose or factual

48.
Id. at 55-56.
Military and Parliamentary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 98
49.
(June 27).
Jus cogens (literally, "compelling law") is defined as "[a] mandatory or
50.
peremptory norm of general international law accepted and recognized by the
international community as a norm from which no derogation is permitted." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 864 (7th ed. 1999).
51.
THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & SEAN D. MURPHY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
21-23, 123-24 (4th ed. 2007).
52.
Brief for Int'l Law Scholars, supra note 38, at 24-25; BUERGENTHAL &
MURPHY, supra note 51, at 81.
See United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1887) (holding that
53.
Congress has the constitutional power to enact laws which protect the rights
guaranteed by the Law of Nations).
Id.; Brief for Int'l Law Scholars, supra note 38, at 18.
54.
Arjona, 120 U.S. at 484.
55.
56.
Id. at 486.
Id. at 484-86.
57.
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predicate that supports the exercise" of Congress's power to enact
legislation.ss This limited role of judicial oversight provides a
reservoir of Congressional authority and responsibility. Congress
may be bound to enact statutes complying with treaty obligations
because "a law which is necessary and proper to afford this protection
is one that Congress may enact, because it is one that is needed to
carry into execution a power conferred by the Constitution on the
Government of the United States exclusively."59
Additionally, Arjona pushed constitutional limits by recognizing
Congressional authority to regulate private actors under the law of
nations. 60 The result of this holding is that few restrictions exist on
Congress's ability to enact legislation in response to CIL, unless the
Supreme Court finds an express prohibition in the Constitution
preventing the law's enactment. 6 1 In addition to limiting the court's
oversight authority of Congress, federal courts have Article III
jurisdiction to ensure that the "conduct of each state, relative to the
laws of nations, and the performance of treaties," conforms to these
laws. 62
CIL has evolved to include "civil as well as criminal remedies."63
Justice Kennedy's bold opinion in Roper v. Simmons could signal a
move towards a new acceptance of international law as a benchmark
for U.S. domestic law. 64 In striking down the imposition of the death
penalty upon minors, Kennedy freely cited to international consensus
and the increased importance of international norms in U.S. domestic
judicial decisions.65
Building on this historical and constitutional framework, the
remainder of this Note will explore U.S. obligations under
international law and how these obligations necessitate upholding
§ 13,981 of VAWA. The Note outlines the relationship between the
Solicitor General's decision not to characterize § 13,981 as a response
to international duties and the current status of the U.S. role in the
international human rights regime.

58.
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 244
n.18 (1983); Brief for Int'l Law Scholars, supra note 38, at 4.
59.
Arjona, 120 U.S. at 487.
60.
Id. at 488.
61.
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920); Paust, supra note 3, at 22021.
62.
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793).
63.
Brief for Int'l Law Scholars, supra note 38, at 18.
64.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-79 (2005).
65.
Id.
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III. IMPLICATIONS AND ANALYSIS:
RESTORING U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS CREDIBILITY ON
GENDER ISSUES AND ENSURING THE CONTINUING GROWTH
OF THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME

The international human rights regime continues to evolve--in
66
both its scope and legal apparatus-at an unprecedented rate.
However, as many will concede-particularly nations other than the
United States and the United Kingdom-the U.S. war on terror
significantly damaged the moral leadership necessary for the United
67
States to remain a powerful advocate for the human rights regime.
Unfortunately, other nations did not fill the human rights vacuum
left by the United States. Rather, the United States' lack of human
rights credibility threatens to truncate the much-needed development
of a uniform international regime. 68
The U.S. failure to ratify treaties such as the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)
and the lack of legislative remedies such as § 13,981 undermine U.S.
credibility on human rights issues-particularly on those issues
related to gender equality and gender-motivated violence. 69 Part III
of this Note attempts to describe the current status of U.S. human
rights credibility on gender issues and the potential problems the
failure to rebuild that credibility presents to the international human
rights regime's continued evolution.

A. The ChangingInternationalPerception
Traditionally, human rights treaties are the most difficult and
arduous treaties to enforce. 70 Given their typical status as non-selfexecuting devices, enforcement mechanisms in treaties are often
impotent to initiate proceedings that carry the force of international

James Crawford, The UN Human Rights Treaty System: A System in
66.
Crisis?, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING 1, 1-4 (Philip
Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000).

67.

Jeffrey K. Cassin, United States'MoralAuthority Undermined: The Foreign

Affairs Costs of Abusive Detentions, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 421, 438-46

(2000).
David M. Malone & Yuen Foong Khong, Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign
68.
Policy: International Perspectives, in UNILATERALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 7 (David M. Malone & Yuen Foong Khong eds., 2003).
Brief for Int'l Law Scholars, supra note 38, at 5-6; Stefanie Grant, The
69.

United States and the InternationalHuman Rights Treaty System: For Export Only, in
THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING, supra note 66, at 317, 326-

29.
70.

Martin Scheinin, International Human Rights in National Law, in AN

INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 417, 420-25
(Raija Hanski & Markku Suksi eds., 1997).
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law against a non-complying member state.7 1 Even when violations
by a member state are irrefutable, the international human rights
regime is often powerless to pressure a sovereign nation into
This difficulty is magnified when the need for
compliance.
compliance is particularly time-sensitive. 72 In these circumstances
the international human rights regime often relies on an environment
of transnational compliance among influential nations to essentially
exert "peer pressure" on other member states to comply with treaty
obligations and CIL.73
The United States is a crucial part of creating a human rights
regime that exerts the necessary pressure to force nations to comply
with fundamental human rights standards. 74 To put it slightly
differently, the United States' participation in the development of
international human rights laws is fundamental to the evolving
human rights regime's credibility and legitimacy in a globalized
community. 7 5 The United States cannot avail itself of its significant
bully pulpit as long as the international community continues to
question U.S. decisions to limit its participation in broadly recognized
human rights norms, including a strong commitment to gender
equality. 76
To the average international observer, the United States has lost
much of its credibility over the last decade to speak on human rights
issues.7 7 The U.S. desire for foreign sovereigns to accede to and
enforce a variety of human rights principles is limited by this lack of
authority.78 In particular interest to this Note, U.S. support of global
gender equality is undermined by the U.S. failure to ratify CEDAW, 79
the impact of the Supreme Court's decision on § 13,981, and the
general perceived lack of interest in combating gender-motivated
violence domestically.
The United States does not possess the moral and political
capital necessary to sustain a position as a human rights leader on
gender equality without signing the CEDAW, the most fundamental
gender equality treaty, and fulfilling obligations mandated by the

71.
72.

Id.
Id.

73.

Nico Krisch, Weak as Constraint,Strong as Tool: The Place of International

Law in U.S. Foreign Policy, in UNILATERALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supranote 68, at 41, 63.
74.
Grant, supranote 69, at 317-18.
75.
Id.
76.
Brief for Int'l Law Scholars, supra note 38, at 5-6; Grant, supra note 69, at
317-18.
77.
Cassin, supra note 67, at 438-46.
78.
Id.; Grant, supra note 69, at 317-18.

79.

Julia Ernst, U.S. Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All

Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Women, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 299, 361-62 (1995).
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ICCPR.80 Foreign nations will ignore U.S. calls to action on human
rights issues so long as the United States ignores its own
obligations. 8 ' Many of the most egregious gender equality and gender
violence issues present in other countries (e.g., the right to vote and
the right to be free from state violence) are not nearly as prevalent in
the United States.8 2 However, the strength of the American voice
nonetheless wanes because the international community fails to
distinguish between the different gradations of gender equality
challenges when assigning moral weight to a nation's voice.83
A fundamental impasse arises when nations do not comply with
international standards of gender equality. Then, not only does the
United States' hypocrisy weaken its moral authority to persuade
nations to combat gender-motivated violence but it provides the far
more dangerous advantage of political cover.84 The irony behind the
U.S. refusal to ratify CEDAW and the Supreme Court's invalidation
of § 13,981's civil remedy is that nations with far worse gender rights
records than the United States use the U.S. inaction to serve as a
shield against the criticism of other nations calling for change to
oppressive domestic laws.
For example, much of the focus of gender equality activists and
their national counterparts centers on the Islamic world.8 5 Former
President Bush initiated a war in Iraq partly out of a desire to
provide freedom to a people oppressed by a tyrannical leader. 86
However, while fighting this war in the Middle East, U.S. moral
authority on gender issues continued to atrophy, in part due to U.S.
refusal to enact internationally recognized programs addressing
gender- motivated violence and gender equality.8 7
In particular, the goals enshrined in CEDAW fail to emerge
because many Middle Eastern nations attached reservations to the
treaty as a condition of their ratification.8 8 While these results may
not legally undermine the object and purpose of CEDAW,
reservations temper the treaty's effect. The propensity for these
reservations "demonstrate[s] that many of these Islamic countries are
actually 'persistent objectors' to the norms surrounding women's

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 357-59. Brief for Int'l Law Scholars, supra note 38, at 5-6.
Grant, supra note 69, at 326-29.
Ernst, supra note 79, at 300-02.
Id. at 366-67.
Grant, supra note 69, at 329.

85.

See David J. Western, Islamic "Purse Strings:" The Key to the Amelioration

of Women's Legal Rights in the Middle East, 61 A.F. L. REV. 79, 125 (2008) (noting that
Islamic countries are a hotbed for CEDAW activists).

86.

Joseph L. Falvey, Jr., Our Cause is Just: An Analysis of Operation Iraqi

Freedom Under InternationalLaw and the Just War Doctrine, 2 AVE MARIA L. REV. 65,
65 (2004).
87.
Ernst, supra note 79, at 355-67.
88.
Western, supra note 85, at 125.
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rights. Indeed, more treaty-modifying reservations have been made
to CEDAW than to any other convention."89 Egypt objected to
CEDAW's "equalizing provisions regarding marriage and divorce."90
Morocco's reservations to CEDAW send a broad signal that, for the
most part, domestic law would remain unchanged despite the
generalized efforts for the progression of gender equality present in
the treaty's language. 9 ' In Jordan, the most fundamental of women's
rights is at issue-the right to be free from honor killings.9 2 Despite
not proclaiming outright reservations similar to Egypt's and
Morocco's, Jordan "does indicate that they are not bound to many
portions of the treaty without giving a specific reason."9 3 All the
above examples of reservations and the implicit rejection of
obligations frequently occur, despite the Islamic world's recognition of
the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, which demands a good faith
effort to comply with the object and purpose of the treaty. 94
The Middle East is only one example of the consequences of the
U.S. failure to ratify a treaty such as CEDAW and to generate human
rights credibility through mechanisms such as § 13,981. It becomes
difficult for the United States to speak out on gender equality issues
in the Middle East when the United States fails to comply with the
gender equality obligations in treaties and CIL. Not only do Middle
Eastern countries view U.S. actions as hypocritical but these
countries use U.S. inaction as a political safe haven to fend off other
Western critics of Islamic policy towards gender equality. 95 Even
with reservations, most Middle Eastern countries are parties to
CEDAW while the United States remains absent from the list of
ratifying nations.9 6 Indeed, the United States may be the crucial
voice that could spark change and challenge the entrenched practices
in the Islamic world due to its economic and diplomatic importance to
the region.97 Moreover, "[t]o encourage states to properly interpret
Islamic law so as to protect the basic human rights of women, a
mechanism is needed to change the underlying attitudes that halt
such interpretations." The United States could play a pivotal role in

89.
Id.
90.
Id.
91.
Id. at 126.
92.
Id. at 107-08.
Id.
93.
94.
Id. at 108.
95.
Grant, supra note 69, at 329.
96.
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Status of
Treaties, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, http://treaties.un.orgfPages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&
mtdsgno=IV-8&chapter=4&lang-en (last visited Mar. 30, 2010) (specifying the
signatories to CEDAW).
97.
Western, supra note 85, at 113.
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that transition.9 8 First, however, the United States must rebuild its
own human rights credibility by complying with ICCPR treaty
obligations, as well as CIL, to combat gender-motivated violence.
The United States can repair its human rights credibilityparticularly on gender-related issues-by providing visible and
creative domestic mechanisms for the victims of gender-motivated
violence to confront and challenge their abusers.99 Section § 13,981 of
the VAWA is one possible strategy for achieving this goal. 0 0

B. A Renewed CongressionalCommitment to Human Rights Treaties
As discussed in Parts II and TV(A), the United States is party to
many non-self-executing human rights treaties.
These treaties
require Congress to enact implementing legislation before treaty
obligations are integrated into U.S. domestic law.' 01
In many
circumstances, Congress is negligent in its efforts to craft
implementing legislation that fulfills international obligations under
non-self-executing treaties. Congress's inaction is due to a lack of
political momentum and to a lack of a clear understanding of U.S.
obligations.1 02 Recharging U.S. human rights credibility requires
that Congress implement rights-based legislation and, just as
importantly, link newly promulgated legislation to the non-selfexecuting treaty it fulfills.os Moreover, Congress could rebuild U.S.
human rights credibility by relying, either implicitly or explicitly, on
CIL when passing implementing legislation or human rights
legislation generally.104
Part II outlined Congress's constitutional authority to enact
legislation grounded in treaties or CIL.'05 If Congress invested
significant effort and relied on both treaties and CIL reservoirs-and
the judiciary deferred to Congress in fulfilling international human

98.

Id. at 113, 147.

99.
100.

Ernst, supra note 79, at 366-67.
Brief for Int'l Law Scholars, supra note 38, at 15-17; Paust, supra note 3, at

209.
101.
See supra Part II.B (discussing non-self executing human rights treaties to
which the United States is a party); infra Part IV.A (same).
102.
Grant, supra note 69, at 317-29.

103.

Rosemary Foot, Credibility at Stake: Domestic Supremacy in U.S. Human

Rights Policy, in UNILATERALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 68, at 95, 111-12.
104.
See id. (discussing the handling of CIL by U.S. courts); Michelle M.

Kundmueller, Note, The Application of Customary InternationalLaw in U.S. Courts:
Custom, Convention, or Pseudolegislation?,28 J. LEGIS. 359, 372 (2002) (discussing the
application of CIL by U.S. courts).
105.
See supra Part II (outlining Congressional constitutional authority to enact
legislation grounded in treaties or customary international law).
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rights obligations-the United States could rebuild its human rights
credibility with foreign governments and populations. 106
Legislation geared at combating gender-motivated violence and
ensuring gender equality offers a unique opportunity to construct a
Congressional role in drafting implementing legislation. Part III(A)
of this Note chronicled how U.S. failure to enact legislation
addressing present gender equality disparities undermines the
overall force of the U.S. voice on gender-related issues abroad.1 0 7
Congressional action on gender issues substantially undermines the
claims of hypocrisy.1 08
Moreover, linking gender-focused legislation to international
human rights obligations, whether as implementing legislation or as
a response to CIL obligations, removes U.S. non-compliance as a
means of political cover for nations currently escaping criticism of
their atrocious women's rights records. Removing this political cover
forces nations to affirmatively answer charges of human rights
abuses alleged by the international community. 0 9 These charges are
most powerful when backed by the force of U.S. human rights
legitimacy.110
A renewal of Congress's commitment to fulfilling international
gender rights obligations could make significant strides towards
repairing the damage to U.S human rights credibility. Congressional
action creates an established precedent to address domestic human
rights concerns that remain visible to the international
community."'
Part IV(C) will further develop the idea of
Congressional momentum in the context of implementing
legislation." 2
Congressional activism on gender policy provides an avenue for
shifting the image of the U.S. from one of military hard power to a
moral and diplomatic leader.11 3 This shift increases U.S. diplomatic
capital, which can-in much the same way a President spends
political capital to achieve policy objectives on Capitol Hill-translate
into success for U.S. foreign policy goals." 4 Credibility in one human

106.
Grant, supra note 69, at 317-29; Krisch, supra note 73, at 63.
107.
See supra Part III.A (describing the failure by the Congress to enact
legislation addressing present gender equality disparities).
108.
Ernst, supra note 79, at 362-64.
109.
Id.
110.
Krisch, supra note 73, at 62-63.
111.
Ernst, supra note 79, at 361-64.
112.
See infra Part IV.C (discussing Congressional momentum in the context of
implementing legislation).
113.
Ernst, supra note 79, at 361-64; Foot, supra note 103, at 111-13; Krisch,
supra note 73, at 62-63.
114.
JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SoFr POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD
POLITICS 55-56, 60-61 (2004); Ernst, supra note 79, at 361-64; Foot, supra note 103, at
111-13; Krisch, supra note 73, at 62-63.
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rights arena (e.g. gender equality) often serves to enhance credibility
in an unrelated human rights arena (e.g. child labor).11 5
Professor Joseph Nye describes the above phenomenon as "soft
power": "Soft power is the ability to get what you want through
attraction rather than coercion or payments."1 16 Nye argues that
"[w]hen American policies lose their legitimacy and credibility in the
eyes of others, attitudes of distrust tend to fester and further reduce
our leverage."" 7 "Problems arise for our soft power when we do not
live up to our own standards," including international standards to
which the United States committed. 1 8 Areas of legal and moral
contradiction, such as those present in gender policy, create the loss
of the legitimacy and credibility necessary to build soft power.119
Readers should be cautious not to overestimate the value of U.S.
credibility on gender equality issues. Certainly, this Note does not
mean to suggest that if Congress passes legislation that addresses
gender problems in America, all of the damage currently spanning
the U.S. moral ethos would dissipate. However, "[s]oft power grows
out of our culture, out of our domestic values and policies," and
reclaiming legitimacy by addressing domestic gender-motivated
violence as a human rights issue can communicate this cultural
value. 120 In particular, Congressional legislation serves the dual
purpose of restoring the U.S. image as a champion of gender equality
as well as signaling that Congress takes its responsibility for
fulfilling international human rights obligations seriously. In this
way, gender legislation advances U.S soft power interests.
IV. PROPOSAL: RETHINKING THE SOLICITOR GENERAL'S STRATEGY
AND UNDERSTANDING THE § 13,981 PRIVATE RIGHT OF
ACTION IN LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS

The Solicitor General should have relied upon § 13,981's critical
stature in the web of U.S. human rights credibility when developing
its legal strategy for U.S. v. Morrison. Two distinct reservoirs of
authority existed for the Solicitor General to draw upon when
designing Congress's defense of the private right of action:
constitutional treaty powers and CIL.121 As discussed above, both are

115.
116.
DOMESTIC
(Eugene R.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

NYE, supra note 114, at 55, 60-63.
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power and American Foreign Policy, in THE
SOURCES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: INSIGHTS & EVIDENCE 29, 30
Wittkopf & James M. McCormick eds., 5th ed. 2008).
Id. at 31.
Id. at 39.
Id.
Id. at 38.
See supra Part II.B (describing these two reservoirs of authority).
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well developed in U.S. law. 122 However, the Solicitor General's
myopic argument, relying on unstable Commerce Clause
jurisprudence and an equally tenuous Equal Protection claim,
prevented the Supreme Court from reaffirming Congressional
authority to comply with international human rights regimes.123
§ 13,981 as
The Solicitor General should have described
necessary implementing legislation to fulfill U.S obligations under
the ICCPR. Additionally, the Solicitor General should have put forth
an international law argument addressing long-standing principles in
international law requiring redress for the victims of gendermotivated violence. Redefining § 13,981 in an international context
provides legitimacy to a failing international human rights project in
desperate need of renewed U.S. leadership and the integration of
international principles into domestic policy. 124
A. VAWA as Implementing Legislation for the International
Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights
The Violence Against Women Act serves as implementing
legislation for U.S obligations under the ICCPR. The United Nations
General Assembly adopted the ICCPR in 1966, and it entered into
force on March 23, 1976, following the necessary ratifications. 125 The
United States ratified the ICCPR on June 8, 1992.126

Because the

ICCPR is a non-self-executing treaty,127 each member state is
obligated to implement laws ensuring the provisions of the treaty
take effect.' 2 8 The enactment of the 1994 VAWA represented one
step in compliance with the human rights protections outlined in the
ICCPR.129
The ICCPR's stated purpose to protect individual human rights
supports member parties interpreting their obligations broadly to

122.
See supra Part II (discussing this development in U.S. case law).
Brief for the United States at 20-35, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
123.
598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29). For previous Supreme Court precedent see Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 244 n.18 (1983); Missouri
v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920); United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 484, 486, 48788 (1887); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793).
124.
Ana Maria Merico-Stephens, Of Federalism, Human Rights, and the
Holland Caveat: CongressionalPower to Implement Treaties, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 265,
297-98 (2004).
Martin Scheinin, The InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights,
125.
in MAKING TREATIES WORK: HUMAN RIGHTS, ENVIRONMENT AND ARMS CONTROL 48, 48
(Geir Ulfstein et al. eds., 2007).
Russell G. Murphy, Executing the Death Penalty: International Law
126.
Influences on United States Supreme Court Decision-Making in Capital Punishment
Cases, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 599, 621 n.128 (2009).
Merico-Stephens, supranote 124, at 296-97.
127.
ICCPR, supra note 7, arts. 1-2, 49.
128.
Paust, supra note 3, at 211-12.
129.
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include the protection of victims of gender-motivated violence. 130
Moreover, the history and state practice of the States Party to the
ICCPR confirm that prevention and redress of gender-motivated
violence are integral to compliance with the treaty.1 3 1 Finally,
subsequent readings of the ICCPR by international organizations
point to a transnational understanding that the ICCPR is one of the
primary tools available to protect victims of gender-motivated
violence from both private and state actors.132
Various treaties-particularly human rights treaties-are nonself-executing.13 3 Non-self-executing treaties, such as the ICCPR, are
not immediately binding in domestic law. Instead, Congress enacts
implementing legislation as the enforcement mechanism.1 34
However, both self-executing and non-self-executing treaties are U.S.
law upon ratification.135 After ratification, Congress has discretion to
choose the best course of action in accordance with the provisions of
the treaty.136 The international law doctrine of pacta sunt servanda
requires that the United States implement non-self-executing treaties
in good faith: "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it
and must be performed by them in good faith."' 3 7 Furthermore, the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires independent
legislation implementing treaty obligations stating, without
reservation, that "[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."138
Non-self-executing provisions drafted into treaties often create
confusion in the international community. These provisions are
blurred when member states enact the necessary statutes to fulfill its
obligations as a signatory nation. Despite this result, the United
States remains active in both signing and ratifying human rights
treaties with non-self-executing provisions attached.' 3 9 It should be
no surprise that international confusion awaited the United States
upon its ratification of the ICCPR.
The ICCPR guarantees rights to individuals analogous to the
rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment.140 However,

130.
ICCPR, supra note 7, pmbl.
131.
Brief for Int'l Law Scholars, supranote 38, at 5-6.
132.
Id.
133.
See Virginia H. Johnson, Application of the Rational Basis Test to TreatyImplementing Legislation: The Need for a More Stringent Standard of Review, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 347, 348, 358 n.37 (2001) (touching on the difference between selfexecuting and non self-executing treaties).
134.
Id. at 356-57.
135.
Id. at 350.
136.
Id. at 347-51.
137.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M.
679, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
138.
Id. art. 27.
139.
Johnson, supra note 133, at 358.
140.
Brief for Int'l Law Scholars, supra note 38, at 7.
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the ICCPR lacks the State Action Doctrine. 141 The Supreme Court
has held that the Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection
Clause do not constrain private individuals, only state actors. 142 By
ratifying the ICCPR, the United States agreed not only to protect
individual human rights encroached upon by the state, but also to
protect individual human rights violated by a private citizen. 143
Thus, the Supreme Court's numerous holdings that gender-motivated
violence constitutes a violation of a woman's Equal Protection rights
suggest that the JCCPR, because it lacks any State Action constraint,
calls for a private right of action to redress gender-motivated violence.
The ICCPR "codifies in the form of a legally binding
international treaty the human rights" recognized by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.144 Just as with statutory construction,
the treaty interpreter garners a treaty's obligations from the plain
meaning of the text in light of its purpose.145 Article (2)(1) requires
that "[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as . . . sex, . . . or

other status."146 Article 3 provides that each member nation
"undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the
enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present
Covenant."1 4 7 Additionally, the ICCPR requires that each individual
have "the right to liberty and security of person."' 4 8 And, perhaps
most importantly, the ICCPR heralds that "[elvery human being has
the inherent right to life" and that the law must, first and foremost,
protect that right.149 The ICCPR requires domestic legislative bodies,
including Congress, "to adopt such legislative or other measures as
may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present
Covenant." Legislation then, is the vehicle through which the rights
encoded in the ICCPR are enacted. 150
The plain meaning of the treaty requires the United States to
implement legislation protecting the right of women to be free from
141.
142.
143.

ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 3.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620-21 (2000).
ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 3; Brief for Int'l Law Scholars, supra note 38, at

5-8.
144.
Geir Ulfstein et al., Introduction, in MAKING TREATIES WORK: HUMAN
RIGHTS, ENVIRONMENT AND ARMS CONTROL, supra note 125, at 3, 13. See also
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (embodying the same basic principles as
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
Vienna Convention, supra note 137, art. 31.
145.
146.
ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 2(1).
147.
Id. art. 3.
148.
Id. art. 9(1).
149.
Id. art. 6(1).
Id. art. 2(2).
150.
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violence. The ICCPR text is clear that the law must affect equality in
both form and substance.1 51
The success of this legislation is
measured by the practical effect of these laws in society. Gendermotivated violence creates an unstable environment for women and
also, in many tragic cases, results in a threat to their lives.
Therefore, if violence exists at a level that disproportionally affects
women, 15 2 then, regardless of current legislation, the United States is
required to promulgate effective means to deter and remedy such
violence. 153
Moreover, the Human Rights Committee, through its general
comment authority, interpreted the ICCPR as obligating states to
ensure that each gender enjoys equal protection from harm. Under
articles 28, 40(4) and 44, the ICCPR vests the Human Rights
Committee with ultimate international authority to interpret its
meaning.154 While many nations do not recognize opinions of the
Human Rights Committee as legally binding, the international
community gives great weight to the findings and opinions of the
Committee when interpreting a multilateral agreement.155
The
Human Rights Committee's General Comment No. 31, relying on the
usage of "ensure" in the ICCPR, affirms the United States' duty to
impose legislation that provides a remedy for victims of gendermotivated violence committed by non-state actors. 156 Additionally,
the General Comment interprets the ICCPR to require "that States
Parties take the necessary steps to give effect to the Covenant rights
in the domestic order."' 5 7 Indeed, the ICCPR General Comments
request reporting to the Human Rights Committee instances of
discrimination by private parties, furthering the interpretation that
ICCPR member nations must implement legislation redressing both

151.
Id. art. 2.
152.
See United States. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 630-31 (2000) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("The [congressional] record includes reports on gender bias from task
forces in 21 States, and we have the benefit of specific findings in the eight separate
Reports issued by Congress and its committees over the long course leading to
enactment.").
153.
See Paust, supra note 3, at 221 ("Choice and power of our national political
branches to effectuate international law, especially in view of the Supremacy Clause,
provide an overriding constitutional propriety of the VAWA regardless of the reach of
the commerce power.").
154.
ICCPR, supra note 7, arts. 28, 40(4), 44.
155.
Brief for Int'l Law Scholars, supra note 38, at 26 n.37.
ICCPR, supra note 7, arts. 3, 5-6, 8, 10, 12-13, 15, 18; U.N. Human Rights
156.
Comm'n, General Comment No. 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on
States Parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1T 2-4, 7,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.1 (May 26, 2004); Brief for Int'l Law Scholars, supra
note 38, at 6-7.
U.N. Human Rights Comm'n, supranote 156, 1 13.
157.
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private and publicly linked occurrences of gender-motivated
violence.1 58
Simply put, the right to pursue a civil remedy under § 13,981 is a
tool for redressing the effects of gender-motivated violence stated in
the international interpretation of the ICCPR. The UN Human
Rights Committee considers the ICCPR instrumental in curbing
international gender-based violence.1 59 Subsequent UN Declarations
go so far as to interpret the ICCPR as providing "a clear statement of
the rights to be applied to ensure the elimination of violence against
women in all its forms."160
Both the plain meaning and
interpretation of the ICCPR provide support for § 13,981 as a key
step in Congress's attempt to combat the horrors of gender-motivated
violence.

B. VAWA as a Response to U.S. Obligations under Customary
InternationalLaw
Congress's enactment of § 13,981's civil remedy draws on
authority from CIL norms. CIL recognizes gender-motivated violence
as a violation of fundamental human rights.161 Moreover, CIL places
a positive obligation on the United States to promulgate legislation
capable of attacking the continued human rights violations arising
out of gender-motivated violence inflicted upon women.162 The
United States' failure to comply with the customary norms
established through state practice and international recognition
places the United States in direct breach of international law.163
Section 13,981 represents a significant step to provide victims of
gender-motivated violence with a remedy against private actors,
thereby fulfilling obligations required as a moral leader in the
international community and a nation legally bound by CIL.16 4
The obligation under CIL to address the problem of gendermotivated violence is rooted in the near complete recognition in
human rights treaties of the pervasive unequal treatment of

158.
Brief for Int'l Law Scholars, supra note 38, at 6-7.
159.
See Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, G.A. Res.
48/104, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993) [hereinafter Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence] ("Nothing that those rights and principles [relating to the
rights of women] are enshrined in international instruments, including . .. the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.").
Id.
160.
Brief for Int'l Law Scholars, supra note 38, at 24-27.
161.
Id.
162.
See Declaration on the Elimination of Violence, supra note 159, pmbl.
163.
(describing obligations of parties under various human rights treaties).
Paust, supra note 3, at 221.
164.

20101

VAWA AS CONSTITUTIONAL

IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION

755

women. 165 This Note has already discussed, at some length, how the
ICCPR incorporates the goal of gender equality into its human rights
regime. 166
The ICCPR provides significant evidence of an
international commitment on behalf of nations to combat gendermotivated violence.1 67 Moreover, state judicial systems often draw
upon the ICCPR to establish and define CIL norms. 168
Additionally, the almost unanimous ratification of CEDAW
demonstrates the international community's recognition that nations
are under a general obligation to take steps to alleviate gendermotivated violence.169
CEDAW requires nations to "adopt
appropriate legislative" initiatives and furthermore, to "establish
legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men
and to ensure through competent national tribunals .

.

. the effective

protection of women against any act of discrimination."o70 The
language of CEDAW fundamentally requires a judicial avenue such
as § 13,981 for women to seek justice from their violent abusers.171
From Afghanistan to Iraq to the Russian Federation, most nations
have ratified CEDAW. 72 While the United States has not ratified
the CEDAW, it recognized the legitimacy of CEDAW's goals by being
a signatory to the treaty. 7 3 Additionally, merely because the United
States has not ratified CEDAW does not mean that CEDAW cannot
be used to define a customary norm that legally binds the United
States.1 74 Moreover, wide scale ratification exhibits significant state
practice of using remedies akin to § 13,981 to combat gendermotivated violence. 1 75

165.
See Declaration on the Elimination of Violence, supra note 159, at pmbl.
(noting that the problem of violence against women is addressed in many human rights
treaties).
166.
See supra Part IV.A (discussing the international community's
interpretation of the plain meaning of the ICCPR and the U.N. Human Right's
Committee's general comments to include the promulgation of legislation to combat
gender-motivated violence committed by private actors).
167.
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
168.
See, e.g., Merico-Stephens, supra note 124, at 291-94 (discussing the role of
the ICCPR in shaping the United States' understanding of international law regarding
violence against women).
169.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women art. 6, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
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Id. art. 2.
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173.
Id.
174.
See Paust, supra note 3, at 216-21 (discussing various ways international
law becomes legally binding).
175.
See Brief for Int'l Law Scholars, supra note 38, at 24 ("The widespread
ratification . . . constitutes compelling evidence of a customary norm guaranteeing
against all forms of gender-based violence and imposing responsibility on States to
redress it through VAWA-type remedies.").

756 -

VANDERBIL T/OURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 43:733

Additionally, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) outlines
state responsibility to take all necessary measures preventing the
degrading treatment of a particular class. 176 The international
community accepts the CAT as CIL. 177 In fact, the CAT rises to the
level of a jus cogens norm and is one of the most fundamental
premises of the international legal order. 178 Accurate and accepted
evidence suggests that gender-motivated violence subjects its victims
to both physical and mental terror rising to the level of extraordinary
inhuman and degrading treatment.1 79 The CAT calls upon states to
take legislative action to eliminate such behavior within its
borders. 180 Under Article 2, the CAT grants nations wide latitude in
determining what measures are necessary to ensure inhuman and
degrading treatment is eliminated from a nation's territory.' 8 1
Moreover, the CAT and ICCPR rely extensively upon the
demand in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal
Declaration) for the protection of human dignity.182 The Universal
Declaration begins by establishing, as jus cogens, the proposition that
all humans are "born free and equal in dignity and rights." 83
Additionally, the Universal Declaration states that entitlement to
human dignity is "without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, [or] sex." 184 No stronger source of CIL exists than the
Universal Declaration.' 8 5 As this Note has previously discussed,
gender-motivated violence constitutes a violation of this most basic
principle of international law.186

176.
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter CAT].
177.
Brief for Int'l Law Scholars, supra note 38, at 25.
178.
Id.
179.
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 630-31 (2000) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (describing the voluminous record of serious violence against women
occurring in the states); see also supra Part III.A (discussing the failure of states to
enforce conventions protecting women).
180.
CAT, supranote 176, art. 2.
Id.; Brief for Int'l Law Scholars, supra note 38, at 25.
181.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 1, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N.
182.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948); Brief for Int'l Law
Scholars, supra note 38, at 25.
183.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 182, art. 1.
184.
Id. art. 2.

185.
See Hurst Hannum, The Status and Future of the Customary International
Law of Human Rights: The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
National and InternationalLaw, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 287, 289 (1996) ("The
Universal Declaration remains the primary source of global human rights standards,
and its recognition as a source of rights and law by states throughout the world
distinguishes it from conventional obligations.").
186.
See supra Part III.A (discussing customary international law norms
condemning gender-motivated violence).
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Additionally, wide ratification of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in the General
Assembly provides further evidence of state acceptance of a
Article 3
customary norm against gender-based violence.187
guarantees women "the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural
rights."'8 8 Strategies to combat gender-motivated violence and the
social and economic discrimination that occurs as a result certainly
garner support from the ICESCR's demand for social justice.
Finally, the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against
Women (Declaration on Violence against Women) chronicles the
entrance of the prevention and redress of gender-motivated violence
into the realm of customary law.' 8 9 This Declaration relied upon and,
in doing so, interpreted a series of treaties as a foundation calling on
member nations to develop an international response to violence
against women: the ICCPR, CEDAW, the CAT, and the ICESCR.19 0
The Declaration on Violence against Women passed the UN General
Assembly in a unanimous vote that codified each member nation's
responsibility and commitment to provide women with an effective
means to challenge gender-motivated violence.' 9 '
The Declaration on Violence against Women highlights "that
violence against women constitutes a violation of the rights and
fundamental freedoms of women and impairs or nullifies their
Moreover, the
enjoyment of those rights and freedoms."1 92
Declaration realizes that violence against women constitutes a
serious impediment to women's security in a free society, ultimately
resulting in an unequal power relationship between men and
women.19 3 The Declaration advises that "States should pursue by all
appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating violence
against women."194 Furthermore, states must implement an avenue
for achieving relief from abusers, "whether those acts are perpetrated
by the State or by private persons."19 5 Section 13,981 serves as the
United States' affirmative recognition of the requirement to provide
remedy and redress for private acts of gender-motivated violence

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993
187.
U.N.T.S. 3 G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter
ICESCRI. For a list of signatories to ICESCR, see Multilateral Treaties Deposited with
the Secretary-General, Status of Treaties, International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src= TREATY&
mtdsg.no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
188.
ICESCR, supranote 187, art. 3.
189.
Brief for Int'l Law Scholars, supra note 38, at 25-26.
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence, supra note 159, pmbl.
190.
191.
Id.; Brief for Int'l Law Scholars, supra note 38, at 25-26.
192.
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence, supra note 159, pmbl.
193.
Id.
194.
Id. art. 4.
195.
Id. art. 4(c).
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present in CIL and codified in the Declaration on Violence against
Women vote. 196
The aforementioned evidence chronicles the roots of a customary
norm against gender-motivated violence that has come into existence
through wide recognition of state practice. On several occasions, the
General Assembly unanimously recognized the need for member
nations to provide an avenue of redress for private instances of
gender-motivated violence.19 7 Moreover, the above section proposes
that not only is gender-motivated violence a recognized human rights
violation under CIL but also that CIL obligates every state to provide
a remedy for victims against public and private abusers.19 8 From
treaties the United States is a party to-ICCPR and CAT-to treaties
that are widely ratified, such as CEDAW, a strong customary norm
allowing victims of gender- motivated violence to take legal action
against their abusers provides a foundation upon which Congress can
justify § 13,981.199
Finally, even if there were any doubt as to the emergence of the
prevention of gender-motivated violence as a customary norm, the
United States must interpret its international obligations in good
faith. Thus, if a customary legal basis for implementation exists for
§ 13,981, then Congressional action should be viewed, with significant
deference, as fulfilling its good faith obligations under pacta sunt
servanda.20 0
C. Realizing the Chilling Effect of the Supreme Court's
Striking Down of § 13,981
Under the tenure of the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist,
the Supreme Court embarked on a new mission to restore the essence
of American federalism and curb Congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause. 20 1 As a result of this revolution, Congress
deferred passing legislation it feared the Supreme Court would strike

196.
See Brief for Int'l Law Scholars, supra note 38, at 25-26 n.37.
197.
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence, supra note 159, pmbl.; CAT,
supra note 176, pmbl.; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 182, pmbl.
198.
Brief for Int'l Law Scholars, supranote 38, at 25-26.
199.
See Declaration on the Elimination of Violence, supra note 159, art. 4(c)
(requiring states to "exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance
with national legislation, punish acts of violence against women"); CAT, supra note 176
arts. 1-2 (mandating legal recourse for victims of violence); CEDAW, supra note 169,
art. 2(f) (requiring states to take appropriate legislative steps to protect women);
ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 2(1) (obligating the states to protect the civil and political
rights of all citizens); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 182, pmbl.
(reaffirming states' "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person and in the equal rights of men and women").
200.
Vienna Convention, supra note 137, art. 26.
201.
Merico-Stephens, supra note 124, at 267 n.6.
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down. 20 2 Like most judges, Congress prefers to avoid appearing weak
The Morrison decision, in
by having its legislation overturned.
particular, serves as a shot across the bow, informing Congress that
the Supreme Court did not tolerate creative expansions of
Congressional authority because a social problem, such as gendermotivated violence, existed on a national scale-a finding of fact the
Court ultimately failed to dispute. 203 The Morrison decision sent
ripple effects through both houses of Congress and the international
community. 204
The Supreme Court's ruling that § 13,981 exceeded Congress's
authority had two distinct effects: deterring future legislation aimed
at redressing domestic human rights concerns and entrenching an
international perception that the United States disregards its legal
obligations under international law and cannot be relied on in
constructing new human rights treaties. 205 As discussed above, both
implications are detrimental to the overall effectiveness of an
international human rights regime. 20 6
Following the ruling on § 13,981, a new debate arose over
whether Congress would pursue future remedies for internationally
identified social ills. 207 If Congress uses the various legal obligations
present in U.S.-ratified treaties as a backdrop for implementing
legislation, the question becomes whether Congress retains the
necessary constitutional authority to begin fulfilling those obligations
without running afoul of the Rehnquist-and now Roberts-Court's
affinity for a strong federalism doctrine. 208
Without a clear signal to the contrary, Congress may very well
decide not to test the Supreme Court's federalism limits, opting
instead for the politically safer route (at least in terms of domestic
embarrassment) of ignoring international obligations. The striking
down of § 13,981 cannot be divorced from its effects on the Court's
treaty powers jurisprudence. "[A] limitation to the treaty power is
not a unitary or isolated consideration" but rather hampers any

202.
Id. at 269-71.
203.
Id. at 300-04.
204.
Id. at 297-98.
205.
See Brief for Int'l Law Scholars, supra note 38, at 29-30 (describing the
potential impact of invalidating VAWA); Merico-Stephens, supra note 124, at 295-96,
299-301 ("Manifesting such concern for protection of human rights in other states, the
United States ought to have the legislative capacity to bring its own domestic law in
compliance with the international responsibilities it has acquired through the
constitutionally established process.").
See supra Part III.A (arguing that both implications weaken the
206.
international human rights regime).
See Merico-Stephens, supra note 124, at 305 ("The constitutionality and/or
207.
acceptability of the doctrine on non-execution, a treaty justiciability question, has been
extensively contested.").
208.
See id. at 302-05 (discussing the role federalism plays in curbing
Congressional power to implement treaties).
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current and future Congressional commitment to promulgating
legislation using constitutional treaty powers or international law as
the sole basis for authority. 209
The Supreme Court's ruling on § 13,981 presents a uniquely
confusing situation because the Solicitor General did defend
Congress's power to enact laws pursuant to international norms. The
Solicitor General's
decision created ambiguity in treaty
jurisprudence. An open question exists as to whether the Court could
have found Congressional authority for § 13,981 in international law
or could have upheld the value of federalism as a priori over vague
international legal requirements.210

The need to resolve this open question with deference to
Congressional treaty and CIL authority is necessary before Congress
takes any noticeable strides in fulfilling international obligations
through remedies such as

§ 13,981.211

This Note suggests that

"[s]hould Congress choose to implement discreet provisions of human
rights treaties, it should be able to do so unimpeded by structural
concerns [such as federalism] that have no bearing on the nature of
the matters embraced by the treaty power."212 Until the Supreme
Court has the opportunity to affirm Congressional treaty and CIL
authority, Morrison'sdeterrent effect remains concretely in place.
Secondly, the Morrison decision chilled the development of a
human rights regime with the United States as a major contributor in
both doctrine and diplomatic muscle. 213 As Part III discussed at some
length, the failure of § 13,981 implicated U.S. credibility on genderrelated matters. 214 However, the impact is as much procedural as
content-driven. 215 Without the ability to implement the mandates of
non self-executing treaties and CIL obligations, the United States
appears as a weak partner in the development of new treaties. 2 16
Governments traditionally willing to negotiate with the United States
on human rights issues question Congress's ability to implement
legislation, effectively leaving those governments party to a treaty

209.
Id. at 332.
210.
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (articulating the
central questions as related to the Commerce Clause and Equal Protection Clause of
the U.S. Constitution).
211.
Merico-Stephens, supra note 124, at 332.
212.
Id.
213.
Promoting Human Rights and Democracy-Two Crises for the United
States, Testimony before H. Comm. on International Relations, 108th Cong. (2004)
(statement of Tom Malinowski, Washington Advocacy Dir.), available at
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/english/docs/2004/07/07/usint9009_txt.htm
[hereinafter
Malinowski Testimony]; Merico-Stephens, supra note 124, at 332.
214.
See supra Part III (discussing how the failure of § 13,981 negatively
impacted U.S. credibility on gender-related matters).
215.
Merico-Stephens, supra note 124, at 300-04.
216.
Id. at 317, 332.
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that they will presumably have to enforce without the strength of
United States' backing. 217
The Supreme Court's ruling on § 13,981 created an impression in
the international community that "judicial micro-managing of U.S.
foreign policy" structurally prevents Congress from acting on
obligations both the President and Congress were active in
developing. 218 Had the Solicitor General used Morrison as a means of
heralding the power of Congress to implement treaties and general
international legal obligations, the international community's view of
the U.S. government's commitment to a human rights regime might
be more complimentary.

V. CONCLUSION

Section 13,981 of the Violence Against Women Act provided a
civil remedy against private actors charged with committing gendermotivated violence. 219 Congress's bold move to include such a
provision was heralded by many, both in the United States and across
the globe, as a much-needed venue for victims of gender-motivated
violence to confront their abusers-a remedy not currently provided
by the Fourteenth Amendment due to its State Action Doctrine. 220
However, the United States Supreme Court held that § 13,981
exceeded Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause and
violated the State Action Doctrine in U.S. v. Morrison.22 1
In a poor tactical decision, the Solicitor General failed to cast
§ 13,981 as fulfilling U.S. obligations under both the ICCPR and CIL,
despite strong evidence that Congress intended § 13,981 to serve this
legal obligation. 22 2 Congress retains constitutional authority under
the law of nations and Article I to enact legislation for the sole
purpose of complying with international human rights treaties and
norms. 223 The Solicitor General should have used this authority to
justify § 13,981 before the Court, and the Supreme Court should have
upheld it on these grounds.
Given the current decline in U.S human rights credibility, this
Note suggests a new strategy for resurrecting U.S. credibility on

217.
See Malinowski Testimony, supra note 213 (describing the detrimental
effect the United States reputation is having on its ability to promote human rights
abroad).
218.
Id. at 304.
219.
Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
220.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
221.
Id. at 617.
222.
See Brief for Int'l Law Scholars, supra note 38, at 5-6 (explaining how
VAWA fulfills the United States' international legal obligation to pass legislation
protecting women).
See supra Part II (arguing that Congress possesses this ability).
223.
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gender-related issues in the international community. Using § 13,981
as a primary example, this Note contends that Congress must
recommit itself to enacting implementing legislation for non-selfexecuting treaties and CIL in an effort to restore U.S. human rights
credibility. Section 13,981 provides a means by which Congress can
restore U.S. credibility on gender equality issues.
Restoring
credibility in this area would positively impact U.S. diplomatic
legitimacy on questions of international human rights law.224
Put simply, when the international community views the U.S.
Congress as unable to enact implementing legislation, while
simultaneously appearing to disregard more general obligations
under CIL, other states' ability to achieve human rights goals is
negatively affected. 22 5 Additionally, the Supreme Court's decision to
strike down implementing legislation for a multilateral treaty further
constructs an image of Congress as impotent to fulfill international
obligations. Consequently, even when it musters the momentum to
jump significant political hurdles, Congress appears a poor partner in
devising new human rights norms, especially new human rights
treaties. 22 6
The United States is on the precipice of losing, perhaps fatally,
its role in an ever-evolving international human rights regime.
Reconstituting the way students, scholars, legislators, and judges
approach § 13,981 offers an analytical template for revisiting the way
Congress and the Supreme Court approach U.S. obligations under
international law-particularly in context of implementing
legislation. Only when the United States seriously considers these
obligations and recommits to promulgating new legislation in the
spirit of § 13,981 will its effectiveness as a human rights leader in an
ever politicized international landscape be restored.22 7
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